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Beginning in the 1970’s and continuing to the present, economists have examined the pay of 
public sector employees.  Usually, an attempt is made to compare the compensation of public 
employees at various levels of government to workers in the private sector who are believed to be 
comparable.  Of the many studies done, there is substantial variation in the operational meaning 
of “comparable.”  Nonetheless, the general finding is that public employees on average receive 
rents or, stated otherwise, are overcompensated when compared to employees in private 
employment.  The estimated levels of rent seem to be highest at the federal and lowest at the local 
level of government.  Despite the general finding, there are substantial differences in the 
quantitative estimates.  The major focus of this paper is on a critical evaluation of the various 
empirical methodologies that have been employed.  An attempt will be made to reconcile the 




or many years, the idea that earnings paid to public sector workers were far above those received by 
their private counterparts generated a debate about the size of government, the efficiency of the public 
wage-setting system, its contribution to fiscal stress and the proper use of tax funds. In general these 
studies were conducted by private academic researchers based on comparisons of individuals‘ characteristics under 
the argument that workers with similar productivity-related characteristics should be paid the same regardless the 
sector of employment.  
 
Total compensation received by public servants during the last three decades appears to have risen faster 
than that for private sector workers. These wage raises have been justified by government-conducted studies that 
tend to suggest that public sector employees are underpaid compared to private sector workers with similar 
occupations, especially high-skill workers. Efficiency and equity principles indicate that government should pay no 
more than what is necessary to attract a sufficient supply of workers, and that a worker should be equally attracted to 
either the public or the private sector. But even though common sense indicates that both sectors should pay the 
same for similar jobs, several reasons can explain compensation differences between both sectors: 
 
First, the wage-setting system in the public sector is not the same as the one applied in private industry. The 
profit considerations of the private sector that yield competitive wages is replaced in the public sector by a 
comparability process
1
 that has proven to be unable to produce the market-clearing wage that would result in a profit 
maximizing environment. Federal wages, for example have been shown to be less sensitive to changes in local labor 
markets and changes in workers skills, compared with the private sector, so that distortions in the public pay are 
                                                 
1
 Since 1862 when the comparability principle first passed for federal blue-collar workers, making their wages comparable to 
those in the surrounding private sector, many adjustments have been made to it. The resulting pay system is set on an area basis 
for blue-collar workers and on a national basis for white-collar workers. For a more complete explanation of the evolution and 
failure of the comparability system see Smith (1974a, 1982).  
 
F 
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increasing (Smith, 1982).  This pay-setting system is based on surveys conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) on nonfederal salaries for a selected sample of jobs that are similar to federal jobs. However only a few jobs 
in the public sector are really comparable to jobs in the private sector. Moreover, to minimize costs this survey only 
examines wages paid by firms of a specific minimum size, which introduces an additional bias resulting from the 
positive relationship between firm size and wages. Therefore, even if it intends to equalize wages between sectors, 
the government is unable to do so because of the lack of knowledge or capability (Van Ophem, 1993).  
 
Second, public sector workers have inordinate political influence. Political issues can also distort public 
sector wages, since public servants are more likely to affect government pay decisions through their votes.  In 
general voters become informed about the issues they care for (rational ignorance), and public workers are those 
with the strongest interest in the pay-setting issue.  Therefore, public wages are influenced by the size of budget and 
voters‘ wishes: government wages depend on public workers‘ ability to compete with other groups over the 
allocation of the public budget, and with taxpayers over the size of this budget (Gunderson, 1979). 
 
Third, there may exist spurious compensation differences due to technical problems. Empirical researchers 
have used data and/or techniques that can be inadequate to test the null hypothesis of no compensation differences. 
For instance comparisons usually are based only on wages, ignoring differences in fringe benefits that represent an 
important portion of total compensation, as well as nonpecuniary attributes of the jobs (stability of employment, 
social status, complexity, working conditions, etc). These other ways of ―remuneration‖ are generally perceived as 
favoring public sector workers, and could justify lower monetary wages in that sector, according to the principle of 
compensating differentials. Some investigators have neglected the selectivity bias that arises from the fact that 
workers are not randomly allocated to each sector, to unions, and that even the labor force participation decision is 
not random. Other sources of bias come from measurement errors,
2
 interdependence of wage settlements across 
geographic areas and/or occupations, cyclical factors, or from the omission of unobserved differences in 
productivity of the worker, such as ability and motivation. Besides, as previously mentioned, human capital models 
tend to suggest public wage premiums, while models based on job attributes oppose that idea, so that the approach 
used matters.  
 
Given the difficulties in answering the question about whether comparable workers performing comparable 
jobs are compensated the same in the public sector and in the private sector, the majority of the studies have been 
limited to either comparing earnings within narrowly defined job classifications and for specific jobs, or analyzing 
earnings of workers with similar measurable characteristics, controlling when possible for job attributes. In general 
they are based on human capital models amplified by some other measurable job-related variables of the form:  
 
Y = ‘ X + ‘ Z +                      (6) 
 
where Y is the natural logarithm of wages or earnings, X is a vector of productivity-related characteristics of 
workers, Z is a vector of job-related or other socioeconomic variables, and  is a random error. The equation, 
generally estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) or Maximum Likelihood (ML) methods, applied to each 
sector yields results that can be decomposed to estimate average wage differentials using a Oaxaca-type 
decomposition as follows  
 
 g –  p = [ ( g -  p) *βˆ ] + [ g ( βˆ g - *) -  p ( βˆ p - *)]              (7) 
 
with s a matrix of average individuals and job characteristics in sector s, where s equals is either public (g) or 
private (p), βˆ s the corresponding estimated returns of these characteristics, and * their return under equality. The 
first component indicates wage differences due to differences in average worker characteristics and job attributes; 
                                                 
2
 The CPS survey, the most common source of data used to analyze wages, has proven to have measurement errors such as errors 
in employment and union status, and under-reporting of income especially for men in the lower end of the income distribution  
(Bollinger, 1998). 
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the second term reduces to [ p ( βˆ g - βˆ p )] when *  is set equal to βˆ g, and represents the differences in 
compensation due to differences in the returns to these characteristics and attributes, called rent. However, if a 
dummy variable representing sector of employment were introduced in the right- hand side of a wage equation, its 
parameter would provide information on the public/private compensation differential. In general, this equation is 
applied on micro-data for nonagricultural workers, sixteen years of age and older. 
 
Early Empirical Studies 
 
The first attempts to estimate wage differentials between public and private sectors can be traced back to 
the 1970s with a series of studies conducted by Sharon Smith. In her analyses on this issue, she stresses the 
importance of the differences in wage structure among sectors, resulting from differences in the wage-setting 
systems, and the possibility of discontinuous working periods. To account for the first point, she experiments with 
two different approaches, estimating separate wage equations for each sector along with single equations 
considering sector of employment as a dummy variable. Experience is usually estimated as age minus years of 
schooling minus six. In a common ‗Mincerian‘ human capital function, marginal returns to schooling and experience 
are assumed to decline monotonically. But as Mincer recognizes, this assumption is not always valid for the 
experience variable (Mincer, 1970). Particularly, he specifies the case for women, whose cyclical participation in the 
labor force is subject to ―family‖ circumstances. These interruptions reduce also their on-the-job training, and 
constitute the main reason why many studies exclude women from their samples.  To overcome the problem and still 
include women in the analysis, Smith proposes to control for the two most important variables that affect women 
participation in the labor force: marital status and family size in all her studies. She uses a three-way classification of 
marital status by itself and interacted with experience: single-never-married; married-spouse-present; married-
spouse-absent.  
 
Smith (1977, 1981) applies OLS to estimate separate human capital models by sex for the public sector at 
three different levels, and for the private sector, correcting also for some socioeconomic variables such as race, 
veteran status, size of urban area, two-digit occupation, part-time and union status, dual-job situation and region. 
The public/private wage differential is then decomposed to recognize the reasons for the existence of such 
differences. With data drawn from the 1973 and 1978 May Current Population Survey (CPS), she concludes that, in 
general, the public sector pays more than the private sector, but the size of the premium varies with sex and level of 
government. Wages are higher in the federal sector than in the private sector, particularly for women and nonwhites, 
perhaps due to antidiscrimination policies that are more effectively applied in the public sector. This gap decreases 
with the level of government.  At the local and state levels, male workers receive similar or even lower wages 
relative to male private workers, while women are paid comparable wages relative to private sector workers. A 
significant part of this gap appears to be explained by workers‘ influence in the wage-setting process. In fact, at most 
36 percent of the wage premium appears to be explained by workers characteristics related to productivity. These 
findings are supported by those in earlier papers (Smith, 1974a and 1974b), where the author evaluates the effect of 
the comparability policy by analyzing earning differentials between public and private sectors, considering either 
just federal workers or all of the three levels of government.  She also finds that race and sex differentials are larger 
in the private sector. A series of studies surveyed by Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1986), some of which are summarized 
in Table 3.1, indicate that there exists a public wage premium, especially for women, that decreases with level of 
employment and that appears to have diminished during the 1970s.
3
  Later on, in 1989 Belman and Heywood 
reproduce Smith‘s work but disaggregating the public sector between public administration and nonpublic 
administration. With data from the May 1978 CPS they find that the average public administrator receives a 
premium of approximately 4.9 percent compared to private sector workers, and of 10 percent relative to nonpublic 
administration workers, but the average public sector employee is overpaid by just 1 percent. This is because the 
public administration workers tend to be lawyers, accountants, and other professionals in the highest paying levels.  
 
                                                 
3
 It is clear that these studies cannot be truly comparable since they are based on different samples, and differ in the measure of 
earnings used and in the explanatory variables included. 
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In 1991, Moore and Raisian try to test the hypothesis of a declining wage premium in the public sector, by 
updating
4
 the work done by Smith, but controlling for some job characteristics such as size of the firm and long-term 
average unemployment rate in an industry.
5
 The coefficient for the first variable is expected to be positive, since 
large firms in theory pay higher wages to attract a greater and better labor force, or firm size can be considered as a 
proxy for undesirable working conditions. Industry unemployment is considered as a way to test for compensating 
wage differentials, assuming that higher unemployment risk should lead to higher wages.  Sector of employment 
enters the equation either as a dummy or by separately estimated equations. 
 
They observe that during the 1970s, public sector workers were paid comparable wages to those in the 
private sector. However, during the early 1980s, public sector workers experienced a negative wage premium. 
Within the public sector, an exception was for federal workers who earned a significant but declining wage premium 
over the entire period. This result is consistent with the argument that wages at state and local levels are more 
subject to the scrutiny of taxpayers. The authors conclude that the government wage premium decreases with the 
introduction of firm size at the federal level and increases at the local level. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the 
federal government tends to include larger ―firms‖.6  The very concept of ―firm size‖, however is highly problematic 
when the subject is governmental units.  It may well be the case that the attempt to control for firm size merely 
disguises true public-private wage comparisons.  They also provide fixed effects
7
 estimations based on workers 
shifting from one sector to another, to control for the effect of unobservable skill differences between public and 
private sector workers. However, the small difference between the wage premiums obtained with both methods 
indicates that just a few individuals‘ qualities appear not to be included in the original model.  Studies considering 
the effect on wages of other job attributes such as repetitive activities, stress, physical strength, bad working 
conditions (Brown, 1980; Hundley, 1993), supervision of others, hours flexibility, sedentariness (Lucas, 1977), fatal 
and nonfatal risk (Herzog and Schlottman, 1990),
8
 among others, are very common in the literature on compensating 
wage differentials. Unfortunately these studies do not consider the case of public/private compensation differentials, 
at least for the United States, except for Brown (1980) and Hundley (1993). In particular, Hundley includes a 
variable representing the time required to learn the technique and acquire the information and skills necessary to 
perform the job. Its negative coefficient indicates public pay compression. They both find evidence of a public wage 
premium, but not necessarily due to the job attributes considered.  
 
The importance of the size of employer and/or establishment as a factor generating a compensating 
differential was also analyzed by Linneman and Wachter (1990) and Belman and Heywood (1993b). The first article 
argues that since the idea is to compare wages between identical workers employed in different sectors, workers‘ 
characteristics and some other variables reflecting compensating differentials (region and city size) should be held 
constant, allowing only for variations in job-description variables: union status, employer size and establishment 
size. The second article introduces the size of the firm in the wage equation after estimating the private sector 
employer size distribution function through an ordered probit and then using this equation together with federal 
employees‘ characteristics (neither study considers state and local levels), to obtain a private-sector firm size for 
each federal worker. Their estimates for year 1983 (CPS) indicate that the larger the size of firm, the higher the 
wage differential, but with this wage premium varying within a wide range (16.90 percent and 5.75 percent, 
respectively). 
 
                                                 
4 They use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID, 1970-1979) and the CPS (1979-1983). They just consider for 
the public sector individuals working in public administration, legislature, uniformed services, and administrative departments. 
Teachers, workers in public medical facilities and nonpublic administration workers were included in the private sector. 
5 The effect of some job characteristics such as compensating wage differentials was already analyzed by Brown (1980). He 
included variables for repetitive activities, stress, physical strength, and bad working conditions. He found evidence of a public 
wage premium, but not due to the job attributes considered. 
6 The general literature indicates that wages and plant size are positively correlated in private industry. 
7 According to Moffit (1999), the techniques with the largest increase in usage in the labor economics field over the 1986-1996 
period are instrumental variables and fixed effects models. However, fixed effects are rarely used to compare wages across 
sectors in United States. This methodology is very common in studies testing for compensating wage differentials in general.   
8 For a complete survey of the literature on the effects of risk on wages, see Fishback (1998). 
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The idea of a narrowing wage gap between public and private sectors does not necessarily mean that the 
comparability policy has been able to reduce the wage differential public workers enjoy, especially those working at 
the federal level. As stated previously, this can result from a series of technical and conceptual considerations, in 
particular differences in the labor force composition between sectors. 
 
Belman and Heywood (1993a) present estimates of a human capital model after controlling for some 
demographic and occupational factors, in order to compare wages among federal, state, local and private sector 
workers. The results obtained from the 1989 CPS Annual Earning Profile indicate no evidence of wage premium for 
public workers, contradicting the common finding of overpayment at any government level. They attribute this 
result primarily to the fact that, in general, studies neglect occupational comparability: ―one must compare like with 
like: accountants with accountants and not with sales clerks, college graduates with college graduates and not with 
high-school dropouts.‖9 A series of papers comparing wages for specific occupations, especially those that have 
similar counterparts in private sector such as lawyers, teachers, postal service workers, nurses and physicians, tend 
to indicate that public workers in these categories are underpaid. An explanation frequently given to this differential 
is that of the donative-labor hypothesis, under which workers derive some utility from the nature of the service they 
offer (intrinsic value of job) or because they want to guarantee that their efforts are helping to achieve idealist 
goals.
10
   
 
A more recent study using data from the March 1991 CPS to estimate a similar human capital model, but 
ignoring occupational categories, contradicts these results (Choudhury, 1994).
11
 He also finds evidence indicating 
that wages increase with education and experience in both sectors, more for men than for women. Buckely (1996), 
and Gregory and Borland (1999), using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics‘ Occupational Compensation 
Survey (OCS), show that this wage premium does not disappear when controlling for occupational comparability. 
They compare compensation between public and private sectors by examining wages paid to workers within 
narrowly defined occupations, correcting both for differences in productivity-related characteristics of workers and 
for job attributes. They find evidence supporting the hypothesis that there are positive wage premiums for public 
sector employees, especially for white-collar workers.  However, using the same source of data, Miller (1996) finds 
that white-collar workers are better paid in the private sector, and their pay rises faster with the level of duties and 
responsibility, relative to public workers.  Lower-paying jobs, on the other hand, are paid better in the state and local 
sectors than those in the private sector. Based on the simple comparison of the Employment Cost Index (ECI), 
Schwenk (1999) analyses differences in wages between private and state and local governments over the period 
1981-1999.  He observes that wages in the three sectors follow similar patterns, increasing by about the same rate 
during the 1980s, but with a faster increase in the private sector at the end of the period. On average, wages were 
increased by approximately 216 percent in the state and local governments and 205 percent in the private sector. 
These differences can be explained by differences in the occupational structure of their work forces. In fact, white-
collar occupations are more common in the public sector (71.2 percent compared to 55.1 percent in the private 
sector), while blue-collar jobs are more common in the private sector (29.8 percent compared to 8.2 percent in state 
and local levels).  Also, workers seem to be spread among a wide variety of job categories in the private sector, but 
concentrated in the service industry (62.8 percent) and public administration (31.8 percent) in the state and local 
sectors. According to Schwenk, because of these differences in industry and occupation mix, any study comparing 
wages between both sectors should control for them. 
 
Musell and Masia (1998) compare public/private wage differentials in light of both the worker-based 
approach and the job-based model. They analyze the possible reasons for inconsistent results in the general literature 
on the topic, contrasting the ordinary least squares estimates of human capital and expanded models, based on data 
from the National Longitudinal Survey for Youth (NLSY). Their results for a pure human capital model suggest that 
federal workers are overpaid, but the premium decreases once firm size, region and occupational group are 
controlled for, and becomes almost negligible if aptitude, tenure, local unemployment rate and union status are 
included in the right hand side of the equation. Therefore, according to Musell and Masia, federal servants are 
                                                 
9 Ibid. (p.1) 
10 Evidence from profit/nonprofit wage comparisons does not support the donative-labor hypothesis (Leete, 2001). 
11 In fact, it is not possible to compare similar jobs in both sectors using CPS data since occupations in each sector are different. 
In this study, the author does not disaggregate public sector by levels. 
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neither underpaid nor overpaid based on their human capital endowments. By this reasoning it is not that the public 
sector is paying wages above private sector wages; it is just buying less human capital for similar jobs. 
 
Changes in the labor force and wage structure in the United States have been well documented by several 
studies (Krueger and Summers, 1988; Bound and Johnson, 1992; Katz and Author, 1999; Acemoglu, 2002). In 
general these studies point out technological change and its resulting increasing demand for skilled workers as the 
main source of changes in the composition of the labor force (technological bias). Besides the differences in the 
labor force structure in public and private sectors, it is possible that differences in average earnings are due to 
differences in the wage distribution between sectors.  
 
Only a few studies have undertaken the comparison of wages by their position in the distribution in the 
United States, but the general conclusion is that the public sector compresses the distribution of earnings of its 
employees relative to those in the private sector. In other words, the dispersion of earnings is higher in the private 
sector.  Katz and Krueger (1991) analyze differences in labor force structure between public and private sectors and 
their effects on wages. According to the authors, the wage structure during the 1970s and 1980s in the United States 
can be described by its acute changes and increasing wage dispersion in general terms: the college wage premium as 
well as the experience premium expanded. But these changes appear to have been stronger in the private sector, and 
then transmitted into the public sector. In their paper, data from different sources
12
 are used to estimate appropriate 
wage equations in order to analyze how these changes affect wages in the private sector and in the different levels of 
the public sector, emphasizing the effects of changes in skill differentials and local labor market conditions on 
public sector wage policies. Two important results are worth noting: First, their analysis corroborates the presence of 
higher wages in the federal government relative to wages paid to private sector workers, while state and local sector 
workers earn less. The federal wage premium appears to be especially large for women. Despite these results, skill 
differentials in the public sector show stable behavior, as opposed to the large expansion experienced in private 
sector. In particular, high-skill workers in the federal government earn less than high-skill workers in the private 
sector. However, less-skilled workers at the state and local governments earn more, relative to comparable private 
sector workers. Second, the federal government appears to be insensitive to changes in local labor market 
conditions, perhaps due to a single national wage schedule for most of its workers. The private sector, as well as 
state and local governments, adjust their overall wage levels in response to economic, and therefore budget 
conditions.   
 
Based on data from the US Decennial census and the CPS for the period 1960-2000, Borjas (2002) 
documents the differences in wage structure between the public and private sector, and their impact on the sorting of 
workers across sectors. He concludes that due to the relative wage compression in the public sector observed since 
the 1970s, it is more difficult for the government to attract and retain high-skill workers. These results illustrate the 
problems faced by the government in recruiting and retaining employees of different skill levels, especially college 
graduates, since their skills are highly valued in the private sector. This can explain the recent expansion of job 
queues for blue-collar jobs and contraction of job queues for white-collar jobs at different levels of public 
administration. Some explanations for this wage rigidity suggested by Katz and Krueger prove to be incomplete: 
bureaucratized personnel systems tend to be inflexible; wages in not-for-profit organizations are usually insensitive 
to changes in the market and skill conditions; declining unionization in the private sector is raising skill differentials 
and wage inequality, since unions usually narrow skill differentials.   
 
Katz and Krueger (1991) do not correct for differences in the distribution of worker characteristics between 
sectors. Poterba and Rueben (1994) hypothesize that there are three sources of differences in public and private 
sector wage distributions: Differences in the distribution of worker characteristics, differences in the returns to these 
characteristics, and differences in the distributions of unexplained wage residuals across sectors. This is the first and 
only study to apply quantile regression to the analysis of the distribution of the public sector wage premium. With 
data drawn from the CPS over the period 1979-1992, and considering state and local government workers combined 
into one single pool, along with private sector workers (not self-employed), they estimate the qth quantile of the 
conditional wage distribution as a linear function similar to Smith‘s: 
                                                 
12 National Income and Product Accounts, CPS, Full Year Outgoing Rotation Group files, Central Personnel Data File. 
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Quantq ( Ln Wk Xk ) = Xk qt  + GOVkt qt                 (8) 
 
where Xk is a set of individual characteristics that includes education, experience, marital status, race, metropolitan 
statistical area (SMSA), and part-time work for individual k, and GOV is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
individual works in private sector at period t. They also consider the possible link between workers‘ attributes and 
the public sector wage premium by incorporating the interaction between sector of employment and level of 
education as an explanatory variable.  Their findings suggest that the level of the wage premium changes with the 
choice of the quantile, but not its pattern over time. The public sector wage premium is higher at the lower end of 
the wage distribution and decreases monotonically as one moves to the upper end.   
 
A common result in the literature is that women are better paid in the public sector than in the private sector 
[Smith (1974b, 1977); Katz and Krueger (1991); Moore and Raisian(1991); Belman and Heywood  (1993a, 1993b, 
1995)], perhaps due to a stricter application of antidiscriminantion policies by the government.  However, it is well 
known that women earn less than men despite these policies. The remedy could be the application of wage-setting 
systems that eliminates the portions of wage differentials due to gender discrimination, which implies the use of 
common standards to set wages in some specific jobs. Comparable worth programs try to translate job attribute 
measures into the appropriate wage and are occasionally used as the base to measure male/female wage 
discrimination within a specific sector. Hundley (1993) compares public/private relative pay before, during and after 
comparable worth programs. Using data from the May 1985 CPS and using the traditional socio-economic variables 
in a human capital wage equation expanded to include occupational categories and job attributes, he finds that when 
these programs are implemented through wage increases in state and local governments, public sector wages moved 
far from the comparability principle, because their wages were already above those paid in private sector. 
 
Studies of public/private compensation comparisons are in general based on nationwide data, or at most on 
pooled data for regions or specific states as in Smith (1974a). Differences among regions are usually introduced in 
the wage equations as dummy variables that control for the effect of differences in cost of living, unemployment 
rates, and local labor markets. However, their results may be inaccurate due to aggregation bias leading to the 
conclusion that wages are comparable when in fact there are intrastate or intraregion offsetting differentials. To 
avoid these problems, Belman, et al. (1994) compare private, state, and local wages for Wisconsin, while Belman 
and Heywood (1995) compare wage differentials for seven states: Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, 
California, and Mississippi. The methodology applied is always the same: estimate separate earnings equations for 
each sector controlling for some individuals characteristics including education, experience, race, sex, marital status, 
urban area, category of employment, and union and part-time status.  They find that state workers earn more than 
their private counterparts in Wisconsin and California. Local sector workers are underpaid in all states except 
California. Therefore, state and local comparisons based on national aggregations are misleading. According to the 
authors, these intrastate differences can be explained by differences in productivity-enhancing characteristics of 
workers across states. They also conclude that, in general, wages in the public sector are more compressed around 
the mean compared to private wages; in other words, public sector earnings are relatively higher at the lower end of 
the pay hierarchy and relatively low at the top.  Kroncke and Long (1998) compare earning differentials between 
state and private sector workers for each state using 1990 Census data. They observe that earning differentials are 
not uniform across states, but in general the average state government pay is higher because it hires relatively more 
highly educated workers. However, returns to human capital investment appear to be lower in the public sector, 
especially for men.  More recently, Kaatz and Morris (2000) compare private, state, and municipal wages in 
Mississippi. With data for years 1995 and 1996 and only comparing average wages for very disaggregated levels of 
occupations, they conclude that public sector workers earn less than private sector workers performing the same job, 




The models described above can be considered as slight modifications of the methodology used by Smith. 
Even though their results are not always consistent and yield a wide variety of measures of wage differentials 
between public and private sectors, they seem to indicate that workers in the public sector tend to be paid a wage 
premium, the magnitude of which decreases with the level of government and with the level of education. Most of 
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the studies were published prior to the development of methodological techniques for handling some of the sources 
of bias described at the beginning of this chapter. Of particular importance is the sample selectivity bias that arises 
when researchers ignore that the labor force participation decision, the sectoral choice decision, union participation, 
educational attendance and other variables usually considered in the right hand side of the wage equation that are not 
random. In fact, if wage structures differ across sectors and/or groups, workers will select the option providing them 
the greater net benefit, according to their own observed and unobserved characteristics. For example, one factor that 
determines individuals‘ self-allocation into the public or private sector is the degree of preference for non-risky jobs.  
In general, studies assume that individuals are risk neutral or that workers‘ risk aversion is the same in both sectors. 
Generally unemployment rates in public and private sectors are used as proxies for the risk faced by workers of 
losing the job. However as Bellante and Link (1981) show, after controlling for some demographic characteristics, 
risk adverse individuals tend to prefer public sector employment. Therefore these assumptions of risk neutrality or 
risk equality are not correct. Several studies have attempted to test the hypothesis of general increasing job 
instability without reaching any consensus [Diebold, et al., (1997); Gottschalk and Moffit, (1999); Jaeger and 
Stevens, (1999)]. According to Bernhardt, et al. (1999), public sector employment seems to enjoy a higher but also 
declining job security compared to the private sector. This trend does not disappear once the worker settles down, 
and is not limited to less-educated workers.  The term of selectivity bias was first used by Gronau (1974) when he 
pointed out that the wage rate a person receives depends on both the wage offered and the job-search strategy he 
follows. The higher his expectations, the higher the wage he will receive, and the lower the probability of finding 
such a job. Differences in search strategies that affect the probability of finding a job should be considered when 
comparing wages among sectors to avoid the bias resulting from considering only the observed wages. But the 
empirical selection bias model really began with the work of Heckman (1974) on wages and labor supply. Although 
sample selection bias is very common in the literature on union/nonunion wage differentials and its effects on 
productivity (Duncan and Leigh, 1985), it has not been extensively applied to public/private wage comparisons, at 
least not in the United States.  One possible reason seems to be a lag in the incorporation of ‗new methods‘ in labor 
economics analysis, probably due to unavailability of computational software for such methods. Another reason is 
perhaps that wage differentials was one of the most rapidly growing bodies of research on public sector labor 
markets during the 1970s and 1980s, when the sample selection bias was known, but the methodological techniques 
for handling it were lacking. The main interest of labor market researchers may have then switched to other issues 
such as interindustry wage differentials due to technological bias, and its relation with globalization processes, 
unionization trends and immigration. The concern about public wage premiums may have appeared later in time in 
other countries, whose researchers learned from the United States‘ experience and were aware of the approaches 
already available to obtain more accurate results.  
 
Gyourko and Tracy (1988) represents the first attempt to estimate wage differentials between public and 
private sectors in the U.S., with both union and government status treated as endogenous,
13
 instead of simply using 
dummy variables as in previous studies.  They follow the Lee two-stage procedure, a modification of Heckman‘s 
method, where a multinomial logit selecting model is estimated considering four possible choices: private/nonunion, 
private/union, public/nonunion, public/union as a function of the traditional demographic variables (marital status, 
race, sex, veteran status, education, and region). The results are then used to estimate conditional and unconditional 
human capital wage functions for federal, state, local and private sectors,
14
 with the cost-of-living index included as 
a separate regressor.  Their results, based on data from the May 1977 CPS, indicate a significant positive wage 
premium for government workers at any level, but a particularly large one for federal employees.  Also, the wage 
gap generated by unions is smaller in the public sector than in the private sector.  Based on the selection forces that 
affect job switchers as a way to overcome selectivity problems, Krueger (1987) used longitudinal data to examine 
the change in a worker‘s wage as he moves from one sector to another, controlling for the individual characteristics 
that remain fixed as he changes jobs. His findings reveal that the average federal worker receives a higher wage 
compared to private sector counterparts.  
 
                                                 
13 Blank (1985) modeled how people allocate themselves between the public and private sectors, but did not use the results to 
estimate any wage equations.  
14 The conditional model includes the selection effects when calculating the expected wage in each sector. 
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In the most recent papers on sample selectivity bias applied to the issue of comparing public and private 
sector wages, Choudhury (1994) and Hoffnar and Greene (1996) use a model for double-sample selectivity bias. It 
entails estimating two probit models, one for predicting the labor force participation decision, considering the whole 
sample (labor force participants and nonparticipants), and the other modeling the sectorial choice based on the 
susbsample of employed workers who work in either the public or the private sector. The specification of the wage 
equations uses the conventional demographic and human capital variables, but includes the two estimated inverse 
Mill‘s ratios. With data from the 1991 CPS, Choudhury finds that men working in the public sector on average earn 
more than men in the private sector, whereas the wage premium earned by women in the public sector is weakened 
by the effect of discrimination. Hoffnar and Greene, more concerned about estimating gender earnings gaps by race 
in public and private sectors, consider separate wage equations for whites and African-Americans. With data from 
the March 1990 CPS, they conclude that both white and African-American male workers are paid substantially more 
than white and African-American female workers in both sectors, but this gender gap is smaller in the public sector, 
being almost zero for the second group.  
 
Studies Incorporating Non-Wage Compensation 
 
Another problem in making wage comparisons between the public and private sectors is that they ignore 
other aspects of total compensation, which include both nonwage pecuniary benefits (fringe benefits
15
) and 
nonpecuniary (working conditions) forms of pay. In a competitive labor market, equality in total compensation and 
not just in wages is expected.  Comparing fringe benefits across sectors is more difficult than comparing wages due 
to differences in options, and lack of information. The proliferation of different fringe benefit combinations make 
the valuation of plans difficult, and an accurate comparison impossible. Each plan treats individuals differently 
depending on the sector of employment, age, tenure, etc. Moreover, not all benefits can be translated into dollars, as 
is the case of job security, working conditions, probability of promotion, and access to on-the-job training programs.  
  
According to Foster (1997), the average total cost for employee compensation is larger in the public sector 
than in the private sector ($25.73 versus $17.49 per hour), but the proportion of these costs due to benefits is very 
similar (about 30 percent). The incidence of these employer-provided benefits however is different and difficult to 
compare. During the 1990s, for example, benefits such as medical and dental care, paid sick leave, and life insurance 
were more common among public sector employees. The differences in costs and provision of benefits partly reflect 
differences in occupations, and make it difficult to compare them between sectors.  
 
A more detailed analysis can be done by selecting specific benefits, retirement benefits being among the 
most important. In fact, pensions represent 7.4 percent of the total benefits in the public sector and 3.1 percent in the 
private sector. In her study, Foster (1997) compares pension plans between private, public, and state sectors.  Using 
data from the EBS, she observes there are substantial differences in these plans. In the public nonfederal sector for 
example, 72 percent of the workers contribute to the costs of their own pension plans, contributing about 6 percent 
of their earnings, while 97 percent of private sector workers enjoy benefits paid entirely by employers.  However, 
the former group receives benefits that are larger compared to those in the private sector, are more likely to 
participate in cost-of-living adjustments, and can retire earlier with unreduced pensions (minimum retirement age 
tends to be 55 in the public sector and 65 in the private sector).  
 
Many authors have recognized that the failure to account for differences in fringe benefits, and other 
nonpecuniary benefits tends to bias the wage differential conclusions [Brown (1980); Bellante and Long (1981); 
Krueger (1987); Moulton (1990)]. Nonetheless only a few studies have attempted to examine wage differentials 
adjusted for the provision of such benefits. One approach compares quit rates in both the public and private sectors, 
assuming that lower quit rates in the former can be taken as evidence that government employees receive higher 
total compensation, since workers consider differences not only in wages, but also in benefits and working 
conditions. Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1986) suggest that better monetary and non-monetary conditions of 
                                                 
15 The Employment Benefits Survey (EBS) provides a list of all the benefits workers receive, such as paid leave, disability, 
medical and dental care, life insurance, funeral services, and retirement benefits. For a complete list of benefits and the 
participation of workers in their costs see Foster (2000). 
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employment should lead to lower quit rates, which are lower in the public than in the private sector.  Even though 
studies in general show lower quit rates in the public sector, the interpretation of these results may not always be 
valid. Gregory and Borland (1999) point out some reasons for this possible misinterpretation. First, optimal rates of 
turnover may differ between the private sector and the public sector. There exists evidence that worker turnover 
rates decrease with the size of establishment, and average establishment size is larger in the public sector than in the 
private one. Second, these studies do not control for job characteristics and amount of specific training, which is 
known to have a negative relationship with the probability of leaving a job.  Finally, differences in the level and 
timing of pensions can account for these differences. Long (1982) shows that public workers are less likely to quit. 
Ippolito (1987) argues that the low quit rate in the federal sector is due to substantial pension losses imposed on 
workers who quit early. This is because federal pension benefits are based on nominal wages at the time of leaving, 
and because pension benefits make up a larger share of total compensation in the public sector than in the private 
sector. Belman and Heywood (1993a) suggest that any comparison of quit rates should be done controlling for 
individual characteristics, including occupational and educational attainment. They find no significant support for 
differences in tenure between comparable workers in the public and private sectors. Cox (1996) on the other hand, 
sees the relative higher federal employee tenure as an indicator that federal employee compensation is above the 
market rate.  Another approach analyzes queues: if individuals perceive government employment relatively more 
attractive, one could expect longer queues of applicants for government openings than for private sector jobs. In 
these models, a worker‘s utility is a function of observable employment characteristics and public/private wage 
differentials. An applicant will choose to work in the sector providing the highest level of utility.  Studies of this sort 
generally support the hypothesis of a higher number of applicants for the majority of the jobs offered in the public 
sector. Krueger (1987) uses job queues data to compare the number of individuals who apply for jobs in the federal 
government with the number who apply for jobs in the private sector. He finds that for the average job opening, the 
federal government receives more outside applicants than does the private sector.   
 
Some studies have examined specific components of fringe benefits or particular job attributes. Quinn 
(1982) compares pension plans between different levels of government and the private sector. Using data from the 
1969 Retirement History Study that includes information on pension plans and Social Security records, he runs 
regressions of wealth levels on years of job tenure, final wage rate and sector dummy variables, in both linear and 
logarithmic form. Wealth levels are adjusted for employers‘ contributions, Social Security coverage and inflation 
protection.
16
 He concludes that pensions are more attractive in the public sector than in the private sector, especially 
for federal and state employees.  Similar results about pensions are obtained by Lovejoy (1988) and Mitchell and 
Smith (1994).  Heywood (1991) compares the public and private provision of what he considers to be the five major 
fringe benefits (retirement programs, health insurance, life insurance, vacation leave and sick leave). Using data 
from the 1977 Quality of Employment Survey, he regresses a probit model for each of these fringe benefits using 
experience, education, race, sex, SMSA, tenure, trade school attendance, regional dummy, plant size, and union 
status as explanatory variables. Additionally, he uses a dummy variable to identify government workers grouped 
together or disaggregated into federal, state, and local sectors. The government employment variable is highly 
significant, increasing the probability of receiving all the benefits, except health insurance, which says that 
government employees enjoy substantially larger compensations than private workers. Within the government 
sector, the provision of fringe benefits is particularly strong at the local level.  A broader comparison is undertaken 
by Braden and Hyland (1993). They observe that public sector workers‘ average hourly total compensation is about 
$23.50, almost 50 percent higher than private industry workers ($16.14). Two thirds of this gap is due to wage 
differences, and one third corresponds to differences in benefits.
17
 The difference in total compensation is 
particularly large for service workers (95.5 percent), while for white-collar workers and blue-collar workers the 
difference is approximately 40 percent and 13 percent, respectively.   
 
                                                 
16 Many government pension plans require employee contributions, but this is not a common requirement in the private sector. 
Almost all private workers and many government employees are covered by Social Security. Federal employees generally have 
full automatic cost-of-living adjustments, while just six percent of private plans are adjusted. 
17 Benefits in the private sector make up 33.2 percent of compensation costs for blue-collar workers, 27.3 percent for white-collar 
workers, and 24.5 percent for service occupations. In the public sector, these proportions are 35.7 percent, 28.8 percent, and 36.6 
percent, respectively. 
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Bellante and Long (1981) address the problem of adjusting wage differentials for nonwage compensations 
and other nonpecuniary job attributes in each sector. They use Smith‘s (1977) regression results to construct indexes 
to compare the return to human capital among private, federal, state and local sectors workers, as given by  
 PjPjPj gj X ˆexpXˆexp                   (9) 
These indexes are then adjusted by the proportion of fringe benefits and the probability of unemployment in each 
sector (assuming risk neutrality), where X p represents the average characteristics of workers in the private sector, 
and ˆ sj is the jth coefficient estimated in the wage equation for sector s (with s= federal, state, local, and private). 
These indexes are interpreted as a measure of sectoral differences in the payoffs in human capital, and other qualities 
weighted by average private labor force characteristics. Their findings, after adjusting for other benefits and job 
security, confirm that the total compensation for public workers at all levels of government is higher than that of 
comparable workers in the private sector.  
 
Even though it is difficult to compare total compensation in each sector, the advantages enjoyed by 
government workers can be summarized as follows (Cox and Brunelli, 1994): more generous fringe benefits; more 
paid vacations days, holidays, and personal days off; more sick time off; value of excess paid benefits free from 
federal and state income taxes, larger annual compensations increases and lower productivity, with shorter work 
weeks; greater job security; generous severance pay; earlier retirement, including routine pension benefit increases 
and paid retiree health care.  The general evidence tends to indicate that differences in nonwage benefits reinforce 
wage differentials apparently enjoyed by public sector workers. Total compensation inequality seems to be larger 
than wage inequality, with a the public sector premium increasing as one moves from the top to the bottom of the 
earnings distribution.  In any case, the magnitude of the gap is sensitive to the inclusion of specific explanatory 




Despite the variety of results discussed, a few firm conclusions do seem to be justified.  There is a 
consensus finding that federal government workers are paid a substantial premium when estimates of that premium 
include non-wage benefits.  Below the federal level, the finding of a public sector compensation premium is far less 
uniform.   While the preponderance of evidence seems to be in favor of the existence of a premium for state 
government employees, the finding receives less support at the local governmental level.  However, most studies 
that find the absence of a premium or even under compensation of public employees at any level tend either to 
exclude all but monetary wages, or employ variables such as ―firm size‖ that are likely to disguise the existence of a 
public sector premium, or do both.  Note that in all results reported in the appendix table, all concern wages only: 
Adjustment for non-wage factors (except ―firm size‖) invariably raises the ratio of public to private compensation 
[e.g., Bellante and Long (1981)].  And even ignoring non-wage factors, all studies surveyed in that table show no 
undercompensation of public employees at any level when an adjustment is made for selectivity bias.  But even 
among the great majority of studies that do find a government compensation premium, the estimates of the 
magnitude of the premium vary greatly.  It is impossible to reconcile the differences among these magnitudes, as so 
many factors differ across the studies.  It is nonetheless clear that the methods of estimation have not been fully up 
to the task of controlling for selectivity bias.   
 
A more recent and powerful way to deal with selectivity bias in nonrandomized observational studies is 
based on matching methods, which have become increasingly popular in medical studies but are not yet widely 
explored in economics.  Matching methods estimate the effect of a treatment by using observed variables to adjust 
for differences in outcomes unrelated to the treatment that originates the selection bias. In fact, if individuals self-
allocate into the treatment, the estimation of the effect of such a treatment may be biased due to the existence of 
confounding factors. Matching methods control for the observed pre-treatment factors, limiting the comparison of 
outcomes to paired individuals, which reduces the bias and generates matched control groups that can be used as 
―virtual‖ counterfactuals.  Among the different matching methods the most common and relatively easier to 
implement is the one based on propensity scores [Rubin (1973); Rosenbaum and Rubin, (1983)], which also has 
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been shown to successfully estimate the treatment impact of a program. In this method, the k-dimension vector of 
pre-treatment characteristics is summarized into a single variable, called the propensity score that is the probability 
that the individual is assigned to the treatment. 
 
In economics, the use of matching methods has being limited to the measure of the effect of gender 
discrimination (Nopo, 2002) or type of education on wages (Becker and Ichino, 2001), and to the impact of job-
training programs.  In this latter regard, the seminal paper by LaLonde (1986) uses the data from the 1970s National 
Supported Work Demonstration to show how the results of standard nonexperimental estimators such as OLS, fixed 
effects, and latent variables fail to accurately estimate the impact of training programs. More recent studies have 
emphasized the role of matching estimators in evaluating the effects of this kind of treatment interventions on wages 
[Ichimura (1993); Heckman et. al. (1997); Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002); Kordas and Lehrer (2002); Abadie and 
Imbens (2002)], most of them based on propensity score methods. However, the potential use of propensity score 
matching estimators to compare the public and private sector wages has been ignored so far.  Perhaps the use of 
matching methods will lead to a definitive conclusion, not only about the existence but also about the magnitude of 
public sector compensation premia.  If previous notions of substantial premia are supported such that confidence 
may be placed in the estimates of magnitude, the major questions will no longer be empirical, but will concern the 
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Estimated Public/Private-Sector Wage Differentials (%) 
Study / year of the data Federal 
Male        Female         All 
State 
Male       Female       All 
Local 
Male     Female         All 
Smith (1973)  20.0          38.0          -3.0        14.0       -7.0        6.0 
Smith (1975)  15.0          21.0  -7.0          6.0                 -7.0        1.0        
Bellante-Long (1975)  18.0          24.0          20.0                 -3.0          8.0           2.0    -4.0       -2.0            -5.0 
Smith (1978)  11.0          21.0   2.0         11.0       -4.0       -2.0 
Moulton (1977)  [-4.5, 4.0]           
Wachter-Perloff  (1978)   34.0  16.0   7.0 
Moore-Raisian (1980s)     9.7         -3.3  -2.7 
Belman-Heywood (1983)     5.8   
Linneman-Wachter 
(1983) 
  16.9          
Conditioned to selection 
Gyourko-Tracy (1977)  18.9 (18.2 w/o selection)  1.3  (0.9 w/o selection)  2.0   (0.9 w/o selection) 
Hundley (1985)  0.0  23.0  20.0 
Hoffnar-Greene (1996)  22.0    (34 w/o selection)   
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